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The Shadow Powers of Article I
abstract. This essay argues that the interpretive struggle over the meaning of American
federalism has recently shifted from the Commerce Clause to two textually marginal but
substantively important battlegrounds: the Necessary and Proper Clause and, to a lesser extent,
the General Welfare Clause. For nearly a decade, these quieter, more structurally ambiguous
federal powers—the “shadow powers,” as I term them—have steadily increased in prominence.
Beginning with Gonzales v. Raich (2005) and continuing through and beyond National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012), the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence has
shifted from its once-typical form of inquiry into the scope of Congress’s commerce power,
refracted through the Tenth Amendment, to become an inquiry into the transsubstantive reasons
for allowing Congress to regulate at all. Paradoxically, the growth of shadow powers analysis has
tended to narrow the permissible scope of congressional regulatory power. The novelty of
shadow powers analysis lies in the sharp line the Court appears increasingly willing to draw
between solid, if controversial, Article I powers such as the commerce power, and auxiliary
Article I powers such the necessary and proper power. The invocation of the shadow powers has
helped the Court find room to maneuver within its federalism analysis, while also appearing to
maintain its commitment to an apparently unmoving baseline of a narrow commerce power. The
growth of shadow powers analysis has obscured the outlines of federalism’s map—to shroud
genuine (and perhaps salutary) doctrinal changes within a fog of constitutional text,
insufficiently overruled precedents, and acontextual readings of foundational cases.
author. Professor of Law and Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Teaching Scholar, University of
Chicago Law School; Associate Member, Department of History, University of Chicago. I am
grateful to my fellow contributors to this Feature, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Heather Gerken, Abbe
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University of Wisconsin Discussion Group on Constitutionalism and DePaul University College
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introduction
What does American federalism require? Most observers agree on a few
general principles: federalism in some form is a fundamental ingredient of the
U.S. Constitution; at minimum, federalism means that the powers of the
federal government are not unlimited; the exercise of those powers must be
grounded in text, structure, or practice; and the states should be understood as
having a definite and meaningful identity, ranging from co-equal sovereign to
regulatory partner. A commitment to federalism requires, in short, that
Americans constantly measure their messy legal and political structure against
a hazily defined and capacious idea upon which there is little agreement
beyond the fact that many of the Founders regarded federalness as one of the
nation’s essential attributes. Today, federalism means, at a minimum, viewing
both the states and the federal government as legitimate sources of legal and
political authority, but little consensus exists as to what that general principle
of multiplicity should mean in practice.1
Where is American federalism to be found in the Constitution? The word is
never mentioned in the document itself, in either the 1787 text or the
amendments. But commentators have long recognized that the text, structure,
and underlying logic of the Constitution assume and endorse a federal system
of government.2 Modern constitutional law typically focuses on three main
textual and doctrinal sources of federalism: (1) the enumeration principle
(Article I); (2) judicial review of state law by the Supreme Court (Article III
plus the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Clause 2); and (3) the Supremacy
Clause itself, especially the requirement that the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the U.S. are the supreme law of the land and bind judges in the
states.3
A related but distinct potential locus of federalism in both text and doctrine
is the Tenth Amendment, which states, “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are

1.
2.
3.

See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 6-9 (2010)
(discussing the foundational federal principle of multiplicity).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 257 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (describing
the constitutional system as “partly federal, and partly national”).
At least three additional and important textual and doctrinal sites of federalism doctrine
should be mentioned: state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; the
Reconstruction amendments, especially section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
abstention doctrines that rely on principles of equity and “Our Federalism.” See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”4 Beginning in the 1930s,
and gaining new vigor in the 1970s, the Tenth Amendment became the
touchstone for the view that federalism means taking the states seriously as
sovereigns.5 Indeed, for many judges and commentators, the mere invocation
of the Tenth Amendment amounts to a normative statement about the value of
the states in the federal structure and the concomitant limits on federal power.6
In some cases, the Tenth Amendment is treated as a constitutional guarantee of
“the province of state sovereignty”7 and “local power always existing” in the
states;8 in others, it is “but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered.”9
How do we know what federalism ought to look like today? Following the
invalidation of the Child Labor Act in Hammer v. Dagenhart in 1918, and
continuing for much of the twentieth century, the paradigmatic federalism
question as framed by the Supreme Court was the correct balance between
Congress’s power to legislate under Article I, on one hand, and the states’
large, ill-defined, and perhaps exclusive regulatory domain on the other.10 In

4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“The Tenth Amendment thus
directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected
by a limitation on an Article I power.”); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852
(1976) (describing “the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions”), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180
(1998); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (2001).
See New York, 505 U.S. 144; Usery, 426 U.S. 833; see also Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory
of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979 (1993); Sotirios A.
Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment?, 1976
SUP. CT. REV. 161 (1976).
New York, 505 U.S. at 145.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274 (1918), overruled in part by United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); see also Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism:
Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 1119-21 (2009) (advising caution when
distinguishing between the “national” and the “local”).
Darby, 312 U.S. at 124; see also Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
535, 549 (2012) (discussing the Court’s treatment of the Tenth Amendment as a “tautology”
or a “truism”).
See Hammer, 247 U.S. 251.
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Hammer, Justice Day, writing for the Court, set forth the robust view of the
Tenth Amendment that echoed down through decades of case law:
In interpreting the Constitution, it must never be forgotten that the
nation is made up of states to which are entrusted the powers of local
government. . . . The power of the states to regulate their purely internal
affairs by such laws as seem wise to the local authority is inherent and
has never been surrendered to the general government.11
Justice Holmes’s dissenting opinion, in contrast, crystallized the opposing
argument from Article I:
I should have thought that the most conspicuous decisions of this
Court had made it clear that the power to regulate commerce and other
constitutional powers could not be cut down or qualified by the fact
that it might interfere with the carrying out of the domestic policy of
any State.12
After 1937, as is well known, the Court adopted an increasingly deferential
stance toward congressional regulation under the commerce power; as part of
this shift, the Court overturned its decision in Hammer.13 But the Hammer
Court’s framing of the debate—inherent state authority over internal affairs on
one hand, plenary federal power within a defined Article I sphere on the
other—continued to structure the debate for decades. Throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, the federalism debate repeatedly returned to the Tenth Amendment
side of the Hammer analysis. As part of the “federalism revolution” of the
Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, several Justices routinely
emphasized the role of the Tenth Amendment in limiting Congress’s power,
most notably its power to regulate interstate commerce.14 Over and over again,
the Court stressed the “boundaries between the spheres of federal and state
authority.”15
The message seemed clear: in order to understand the meaning of
federalism, one had to begin from the premise that the domains of state and

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
Id. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Darby, 312 U.S. 100. On 1937 and the “switch in time,” see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 117-19 (Sanford Levinson ed., 5th ed. 2010).
U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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federal power were fundamentally and forever distinct. Concurrent power was
downplayed and sometimes derided as impractical; experiments with
overlapping state and federal authority were frequently deemed hazardous to
the correct constitutional structure.16 The state and the federal bailiwicks were
regarded as separate spheres,17 and the Tenth Amendment functioned as a
shield around the “States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions,”18 functions that were “essential to [the]
separate and independent existence” of the states.19 The terms of the federalism
debate appeared to be set: a majority of the Justices would analyze Congress’s
Article I powers, especially the commerce power, through the lens of the Tenth
Amendment, with a baseline commitment to protecting the special domain of
state regulatory authority.20

16.

17.

18.
19.
20.

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (stating that “[t]he constitutional
authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the ‘consent’ of the governmental unit whose
domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States”); see
also Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950); Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense
and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998). But see New York, 505 U.S. at
194 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 was “very much the product of cooperative federalism, in which
the States bargained among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to sanction”);
see also SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES OF STATES’ RIGHTS 30-32 (2013) (equating “dual
federalism” with “states’ rights federalism” and critiquing both as insufficiently attentive to
the nation’s public good).
An important and growing body of scholarship provides a richer analysis of concurrent
power. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 459 (2012) (arguing that state administration of federal law
“counteracts the tendency of statutory ambiguity and broad delegations of authority to
enhance federal executive power”); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (discussing the ways in which states can
resist federal policy).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Were the Federal Government to take
over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do
with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and
state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.” (emphasis
added)); see also Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can it Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1513, 1527 (2002) (“For generations the Court had conceived the constitutional values of
federalism as served by the maintenance of separate and incompatible spheres of state and
federal authority.”).
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 695 (1911)).
See Lane Cnty. v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868) (“[I]n many articles of the Constitution the
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But the terms of the federalism debate have recently changed, with
important and potentially far-reaching consequences that have not been fully
appreciated—even by the Court itself. The interpretive struggle over the
meaning of American federalism has shifted from the Commerce Clause to two
textually marginal but substantively important battlegrounds: the Necessary
and Proper Clause21 and, to a lesser extent, the General Welfare Clause.22 To be
sure, the higher-profile commerce power continues to attract an enormous
amount of judicial attention and scholarly commentary.23 But for nearly a
decade, the quieter, more structurally ambiguous federal powers listed at the
head and foot of Article I have steadily increased in prominence. Today, the
battles of judicial federalism are fought not across the well-trampled no-man’sland of the commerce power or the Tenth Amendment, but in the less
trafficked doctrinal redoubts of what I term the “shadow powers.” This
expansion of the battlefield carries important consequences for the meaning of
modern federalism.
Beginning with Gonzales v. Raich24 in 2005 and continuing through United
States v. Comstock,25 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,26 and
United States v. Kebodeaux,27 the Supreme Court’s “federalism revolution”28 has

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

necessary existence of the states . . . is distinctly recognized. To them nearly the whole
charge of interior regulation is committed or left; to them and to the people all powers not
expressly delegated . . . are reserved.”). The paradigmatic example of invalid federal
incursion on the sovereign power of the “States qua States” comes in the
“anticommandeering” realm, in which the Court has held that Congress may not compel
state legislatures or executive officials to carry out federal programs. See, e.g., Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“[T]he Federal Government may not compel the
States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”).
Moreover, as recent scholarship demonstrates, the on-the-ground conditions of federalism
sometimes diverge significantly from the Court’s sharply defined scheme. See Abbe R.
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal
Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH L. REV. 1 (2010).
545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding penalties against the production and use of home-grown
medicinal marijuana under the federal Controlled Substances Act).
560 U.S. 126 (2010) (upholding federal civil commitment of sex offenders already in federal
custody).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding the individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act but invalidating the Medicaid expansion provision).
133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013) (upholding federal post-court-martial sex-offender registration
requirements).
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taken on a new form. The Court’s federalism jurisprudence has shifted from its
once-typical form of inquiry into the scope of Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce, refracted through the Tenth Amendment,29 to become an
inquiry into the transsubstantive reasons for allowing Congress to regulate at
all. This transformation has been especially significant when the Court views
Congress as venturing into a domain not explicitly specified in the text of
Article I. Analytically, the Justices in the majority in these cases seem to be
motivated more by a concern about the expansion of federal regulatory power
itself, and somewhat less by a “new federalist”30-style belief in a categorical
distinction between the proper spheres of state and federal power.
The return to prominence of this pair of ill-defined but foundational
provisions of Article I means many things: doctrinal instability, opportunities
for creative litigation, opaque or oracular or overly tentative pronouncements
by the Justices. But it also provides a moment to think structurally about the
Constitution, and perhaps to reach some conclusions about what federalism
does and does not require. The resurgence of the Necessary and Proper and
General Welfare Clauses in the doctrine is not a sign of intellectual
impoverishment or a mere result of crafty litigation strategies; neither is it a
retreat to the weedy curtilage of the federalism field. Instead, the return of the
shadow powers heralds an opportunity to take up a central question of
federalism: Is it possible to conceive of the states as having significance while
also recognizing the logic of Holmes’s point in Hammer? Holmes’s dissent
insisted that federalism concerns were irrelevant to determining whether a
particular act was within Congress’s power.31 Thus, he maintained, a court

28.

29.
30.

31.

Fallon, supra note 5, at 430 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting widespread scholarly
focus on the Court’s federalism case law); see also Jackson, supra note 5, at 2181-82 (1998)
(discussing the Court’s “federalist revival”).
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 97 (2012) (discussing the
emergence of “New Federalism” theories, “first as a political movement in the 1970s and
1980s, and then as the judicial revolution of the 1990s”); see also Neil S. Siegel,
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1648-50
(2006) (describing the benefits of federalism); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 51-64 (2004) (evaluating the Court’s treatment of “the values
that motivate our attachment to federalism in the first place”).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that “if an
act is within the powers specifically conferred upon Congress . . . it is not made any less
constitutional because of the indirect effects that it may have, however obvious it may be
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need not conduct a separate Tenth Amendment analysis in order to satisfy
federalism’s demands.32 According to this view, if a particular act of Congress is
within the domain of Congress’s power, then one need not keep probing to ask
about an amorphous conception of state sovereignty.
Recent doctrine has thus partially revived Justice Holmes’s conviction that
the best way to approach the federalism question is by inquiring into the scope
of Congress’s powers. This inquiry increasingly focuses on the shadow powers
of Article I: the taxing and spending powers of the General Welfare Clause,
and the necessary and proper power. The revival is only partial, however,
because a majority of the Justices appears to believe, unlike Justice Holmes,
that the real peril is the growth and judicial legitimation of plenary federal
power, or a “federal police power.”33 Concern about the growth of federal
power (via the expansion of congressional power) is articulated in terms of
concern about the expansion of Congress’s power under Article I, rather than
in previous decades’ “new federalist” terms, which focused on the erosion of
the states’ power.34 As a matter of interpretation, Article I has returned to
center stage, and the Tenth Amendment is a secondary player. But unlike
Justice Holmes’s Hammer dissent, which offered a broad reading of Article I in
support of the federal regulation at issue, the current Court’s shadow powers
analysis tends, paradoxically, to constrain federal power.
My descriptive claim is that the clauses operate as shadow powers of Article
I, and that their return to the center of debate in the Court and in the broader
public sphere can provide both a problem and an opportunity for
understanding how the United States’ federal structure should operate. Both
powers have a potentially capacious quality, unlike the other Article I powers,

32.

33.

34.

that it will have those effects”), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
Id. at 281 (stating that Congress “may carry out its views of public policy whatever indirect
effect they may have upon the activities of the States. Instead of being encountered by a
prohibitive tariff at her boundaries the State encounters the public policy of the United
States which it is for Congress to express”); see also Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power
of Congress—Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 HARV. L. REV. 548, 550 (1923) (arguing that the
“very phraseology” of the Tenth Amendment “makes clear its inapplicability as a test of the
scope of the delegated powers of the national government”).
United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2507 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the
judgment) (“I worry that incautious readers will think they have found in the majority
opinion something they would not find in either the Constitution or any prior decision of
ours: a federal police power.”).
See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549-54 (1985).
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which are much more bounded and subject-specific (e.g., “[t]o borrow
[m]oney on the credit of the United States”;35 “[t]o coin [m]oney”;36 “[t]o
constitute [t]ribunals inferior to the [S]upreme Court”37). The shadow powers
tend to become contested, and to become the linchpins of judicially enforced
federalism, when contemporary legal and political players determine—for a
variety of reasons, from overly rigid case law to political expediency—that there
is no more room to move the doctrine in the domain of “real” enumerated
powers, such as the commerce power.
In addition to describing the shadow powers and explaining their doctrinal
evolution, I also make a normative argument. A description of shadow powers
analysis might initially lead one to believe that the Court is using the shadow
powers to expand, quietly, Congress’s power beyond the ostensible limits set
forth in other doctrinal areas.38 But such a conclusion reads the direction of the
doctrinal change exactly backward. Paradoxically, the growth of shadow
powers analysis has tended to narrow the permissible scope of congressional
regulatory power.
But my critique of shadow powers analysis as deployed by the Court is not
based on its direction alone. The prominent role of the shadow powers in the
Court’s recent decisions is both a doctrinally unprecedented and an unhelpful
development that fails to set meaningful standards for how federalism should
work in practice. As I will demonstrate, the novelty of shadow powers analysis
lies in the sharp line the Court appears increasingly willing to draw between
solid, if controversial, Article I powers such as the commerce power, and
auxiliary Article I powers such as the necessary and proper power.39 In recent
doctrine, the invocation of the shadow powers has helped the Court find room
to maneuver within its federalism analysis, while also appearing to maintain its
commitment to an apparently unmoving post-Lopez baseline of a narrow
commerce power. This maneuvering might be productive if it were carried out
explicitly, with some discussion by the Justices of the reasons for preferring to

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
Id. cl. 5.
Id. cl. 9.
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 278 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (noting, in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as an exercise of
the commerce power rather than Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, that “nothing in the Civil Rights Cases, . . . which invalidated the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, gives the slightest support to the argument that Congress is without power
under the Commerce Clause to enact the present legislation”).
See infra Section II.B, Part III.
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adjudicate federalism at its doctrinal and textual periphery rather than at its
center. But the result of the growth of shadow powers analysis has in fact been
to obscure the outlines of federalism’s map—to shroud genuine (and perhaps
salutary) doctrinal changes within a fog of constitutional text, under-overruled
precedents, and acontextual readings of foundational cases such as McCulloch
v. Maryland.40
This essay proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, I explain the meaning of the
phrase “shadow powers” and explore the connections among the shadow
powers and the other frequently invoked categories of federal power—implied
powers, incidental powers, and enumerated powers. Parts II and III discuss the
two principal shadow powers: the necessary and proper power and the taxing
and spending powers contained within the general welfare power. Part IV
examines the consequences of the emergence of the shadow powers for the
development of federalism doctrine. It also argues that the concept of “union”
could serve as a productive means of reframing the debates over federalism and
might provide a “rule of engagement” for courts and other interpreters dealing
with questions of federalism.
i. the contours of the shadow powers
To ask what it means to have the power to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers”41 and
to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”42 is
to ask existential questions about the scope of federal power—and, therefore,
about the meaning of the Union. One reason for viewing the necessary and
proper power and the general welfare power as “shadow powers” is that they
have a similar status among the Article I powers, both structurally and
doctrinally. Both potentially give Congress a broad regulatory ambit beyond
the typical powers over commerce, money, the army, post offices and post
roads, and the like.
Since the Founding, and even during the Philadelphia Convention and the
state ratifying conventions, there have been debates about (1) what each
clause’s language means (what exactly does it mean for a measure to be

40.
41.
42.

17 U.S. 316 (1819).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Id. cl. 1.
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“necessary” and “proper,” and what is the “general welfare of the United
States”?), and (2) how the powers set forth in each clause relate to the other
enumerated powers. The second question is fundamentally a question about
how the Necessary and Proper and General Welfare Clauses fit into the broader
scheme of congressional power, and therefore into the structure of federalism.
The clauses’ impact can be viewed relatively narrowly, as concerning only the
power of Congress, or more broadly, as implicating the entire architecture of
federalism. For some Justices and commentators, this latter view necessarily
implicates a mirror-image shadow power on behalf of the states that is lodged
in the Tenth Amendment.43
To begin, the clauses are historically linked. Although the records of the
Constitutional Convention shed little light on what, if any, debates surrounded
the drafting of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the sources are more
forthcoming in their discussion of the origins of the General Welfare Clause.
Equally important are the pre-1787 precedents for the powers. An antecedent
use of the phrase “necessary and proper” can be found in a 1765 pamphlet
written by the Maryland lawyer and colonial official Daniel Dulany.44 As part
of a broad critique of the Stamp Act, Dulany argued that Parliament had
misunderstood the constitutional basis of the British Empire. The North
American colonies were concededly “Dependent upon Great-Britain,” Dulany
observed.45 But only the colonies’ own local legislatures possessed the authority
to levy “internal Taxes.”46 As a solution to the mounting confrontation
between the colonies and their metropolitan cousins, Dulany proposed
allocating the power to lay internal taxes to the colonial legislatures, and the
power to tax for broader, imperial purposes to Parliament. “May not then the

43.

44.

45.
46.

See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 931 n.15 (1997) (describing the Tenth
Amendment as one of “the Constitution’s guarantees of federalism”); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that
congressional overreach under the commerce power would “devour the essentials of state
sovereignty, though that sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment”); see also Lynn
A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE
L.J. 75, 78 n.15 (2001) (describing the Tenth Amendment, along with the Eleventh
Amendment, as “provisions clearly meant to limit the central government’s authority”).
DANIEL DULANY, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING TAXES IN THE BRITISH
COLONIES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF RAISING A REVENUE, BY ACT OF PARLIAMENT 15 (Annapolis,
Jonas Green 2d ed. 1765); see also LACROIX, supra note 1, at 50-51 (discussing Dulany’s views
on the division of political and legal authority between the colonies and the metropole in
Britain’s North American empire).
DULANY, supra note 44, at 15.
Id. at 15.
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Line be distinctly and justly drawn between such Acts as are necessary, or proper,
for preserving or securing the Dependence of the Colonies, and such as are not
necessary or proper for that very important Purpose?”47 The idea that legislation
might have to satisfy a test of necessity and propriety in order to be valid was
thus present in Anglo-American constitutional argument more than two
decades before the Constitution was drafted. These precedents are useful not to
establish a causal intellectual lineage between colonial commentators and the
drafters of the Constitution, but rather to suggest that the phrases were already
becoming recognized legal terms of art well before the Revolution.
Two years later, in response to the Townshend Acts of 1767, the
Philadelphia lawyer John Dickinson’s Letters from a Farmer invoked the
“general welfare” of the empire as a permissible justification for Parliament to
tax the colonies.48 Prior to the Stamp Act of 1765, Dickinson argued, “every
statute relating to these colonies from their first settlement to this time” was
“calculated to preserve or promote a mutually beneficial intercourse between
the several constituent parts of the empire.” To be sure, many of those acts had
levied trade duties on the colonies. “[Y]et those duties were always imposed
with design to restrain the commerce of one part that was injurious to another,
and thus to promote the general welfare.”49 Taxation that was explicitly
intended to harmonize trade within the empire, and thus to balance intraimperial interests against one another, was permissible. The problem with the
Stamp Act, however, was its overt and unprecedented goal of “raising a
revenue.”50
As the examples of Dulany and Dickinson demonstrate, some conception of
both powers predated the drafting of the Constitution.51 The idea that one

47.
48.

49.
50.
51.

Id. (emphasis added).
JOHN DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER, IN PENNSYLVANIA, TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE
BRITISH COLONIES 16 (Philadelphia, J. Almon 1774); see also LACROIX, supra note 1, at 60-64
(discussing Dickinson’s theories of taxation).
DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 13-16.
Id. at 16.
See also ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III (1777) (stating that “[t]he said states
hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common
defence, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare”); An Act for
Ascertaining the Rates of Foreign Coins in Her Majesties Plantations in America, in ACTS AND
LAWS OF HIS MAJESTY’S PROVINCE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE IN NEW ENGLAND 140, 142
(Portsmouth, Daniel Fowle 1761) (“[N]othing in this Act . . . shall extend or be construed to
restrain her Majesty from regulating, and settling the several rates of the said species of
foreign silver coins within any of the said colonies or plantations . . . according to such other
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might assess legislative power as “necessary and proper” or in service of the
“general welfare” was available to British North Americans at least two decades
before the members of the Constitutional Convention included the phrases in
Article I. Both notions were part of the intellectual portmanteau that
contemporary observers used to understand how political unions based on a
significant degree of centralized legislative authority ought function.
The meaning of both clauses has been the subject of significant debate from
the Founding to the present day, as commentators have tried to determine
whether they were lesser, auxiliary powers that must be attached to another,
underlying power or whether they are standalone powers in their own right
(albeit with some limits).52 The broad phrasing of the clauses, as well as their
bracketing locations at the beginning and end of Article I, suggests that they
are in some sense fundamental congressional powers. The course of their
doctrinal development has been as uneven and disputed as this description
suggests. Commentators have argued not only about the proper subject of each
clause, but also about each clause’s structural and theoretical connection to the
rest of Article I, and hence to the Constitution as a whole.53
The clauses are also similar in their relationship to the rest of Article I.
Commentators typically use the phrase “enumerated powers of Article I” to
refer to a specific set of clauses granting authority to Congress.54 Among the
powers housed in Article I, the most commonly invoked are the commerce
power and the taxing and spending powers. Other frequently cited powers
include the treaty power, the war power, the power to regulate immigration
and citizenship, and the set of powers over domestic affairs such as bankruptcy
law and the coining of money.55 Clearly, all these are enumerated powers, in
that they are listed in the text of Article I, Section 8, which begins “Congress
shall have power.” But the nature of the General Welfare Clause and the

52.
53.
54.

55.

rates and proportions as her Majesty . . . shall from time to time judge proper and necessary
. . . .”); cf. GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
(2010) (tracing the clause’s origins to English and colonial principles of fiduciary
responsibility).
See infra Parts II-III.
See, e.g., John Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1101 (2011).
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 242 (3d ed.
2006) (“Article I, §8, of the Constitution contains 18 clauses enumerating specific powers of
Congress.”).
See id. at 233-335 (focusing on these powers in a chapter titled “The Federal Legislative
Power”).
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Necessary and Proper Clause is more ambiguous. True, both clauses describe
powers of Congress, rather than limitations on power elsewhere granted.56 And
the taxing and spending powers, which are the modern doctrinal nodes of the
General Welfare Clause, are typically denominated as enumerated powers.57
But neither clause refers specifically to a power of government over a particular
domain, such as post offices or the coining of money. Moreover, each clause
describes the general contours of some permissible types of congressional
regulation, but not all regulation by Congress under its enumerated powers
must conform to the contours of one or the other of these two clauses. Instead,
the clauses appear to offer alternative categories of regulation, in addition to
the narrower subjects listed in the rest of Section 8. Most striking is the opacity
of the clauses’ language: “the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States” and “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers” are phrases that invite—and perhaps
even require—interpretation.
The clauses do differ from each other in important respects, however.
Significantly, the Necessary and Proper Clause refers explicitly to the powers
listed in the preceding seventeen clauses of Article I, Section 8, and defines the
necessary and proper power with reference to those “foregoing powers.” The
necessary and proper power is therefore by its own terms connected with the
other sources of congressional regulatory authority; its purpose, according to
current doctrine, is to enable Congress to carry out those other powers.58 The
General Welfare Clause, in contrast, stands on its own among the Article I
powers, on an equal footing with the commerce, naturalization, and other
powers, rather than dependent on those powers as necessary predicates to its
own exercise. If the necessary and proper power is best understood as an
auxiliary power to Congress’s primary powers under Article I,59 the General
Welfare Clause—especially when broken down into its modern doctrinal
components, the taxing and spending powers—is just such a primary power.
The ability to tax and spend, even if the permissible goals of that taxing and

56.
57.
58.

59.

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819) (listing the “necessary and
proper” clause among the grants of power rather than limits).
See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (spending); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936) (taxing).
This view has not always been the understanding of the purpose of the necessary and proper
power. During the founding period, commentators offered numerous interpretations of the
power, many of which have since been rejected. See infra Part II.
See Harrison, supra note 53, at 1122 (distinguishing between “main power[s]” and
“incidents”).
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spending are limited to the common defense and general welfare,60 is an
independent Article I power in a way that the necessary and proper power has
never been held to be.61
A related distinction follows from what modern doctrine regards as the
auxiliary status of the necessary and proper power, as contrasted with the
primary nature of the taxing and spending powers under the General Welfare
Clause. This distinction turns not on the particular power’s ability to stand on
its own as a basis of congressional regulation (the primary/auxiliary question),
but rather on how we conceptualize the source of the power—whether it
derives its authority from the text itself, or whether the text requires something
more, such as common law judicial interpretation or historical practice.62
The enumerated powers of Article I are typically regarded as deriving their
authority from the fact of their enumeration: they exist because they are listed
in the text of Article I, which created the powers as well as the institution
(Congress) that wields them.63 During the controversies of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries surrounding the scope of the taxing and
spending powers contained within the General Welfare Clause,64 the
disagreement centered on the meaning of the phrase “general welfare,” not on
the ultimate source of authority behind the provision in Article I. Certainly,
commentators wrangled over the relationship between the concept of the
“general welfare” and the more specific powers set forth in the other clauses.65

60.
61.

62.

63.

64.
65.

See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (“[T]he exercise of the spending power
must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’”); Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 586.
See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (noting that the Necessary
and Proper Clause gives Congress authority to enact statutes that are “rationally related to
the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power”); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 323-25.
On common law constitutional interpretation, see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION (2010). On historical practice, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012); and Alison L.
LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75 (2012).
This positivist interpretation of Article I as in itself a source of law can be contrasted with
some commentators’ view of Article II as a restatement of inherent executive authority.
According to this argument, presidential power under Article II is broader than
congressional power under Article I because Article I refers to “legislative powers herein
granted,” while Article II refers only to “the executive power.” See LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 63-68 (2014).
See infra Part III.
See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at
181 (2010) (describing Antifederalists’ concerns about the breadth of the taxing power of
Article I, in particular the fact that it permitted Congress to “raise funds to pay the debts and
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But they did not appear to question the theoretical justification for the
Constitution’s grant to Congress of some general welfare power (whatever the
scope of that power turned out to be). The fact of the enumeration was
sufficient to grant Congress some set of powers to tax and spend, with some
connection to a notion of the “general welfare of the United States.” The battle
concerned the scope of the power, not its source.
This positivist vision of enumeration becomes more complicated, however,
when applied to the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Given that
the Necessary and Proper Clause incorporates the preceding seventeen clauses
by reference (“carrying into execution the foregoing powers”), one might ask
whether the necessary and proper power is an enumerated power. It might be
something else altogether, categorically distinct: an “implied” or an
“incidental” power,66 or a “non-enumerated” power.67 To be sure, the
overarching power—to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers”—is plainly enumerated in the
text of Article I. But the subjects to which that power should be applied, and
the ends to which the power should be put, are not enumerated.68 Unlike the
Commerce Clause, which tells us that Congress possesses the power to regulate

66.

67.

68.

provide for the ‘common welfare’ of the United States, but the debts were not confined to
those already contracted, and the term ‘general welfare’ could cover ‘any expenditure
whatsoever’”).
See James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558 (1924) (referring to the necessary
and proper power as a “non-enumerated or ‘implied’” power). The case consolidated two
appeals from the Southern District of New York brought by “manufacturers and dealers in
intoxicating malt liquors” to enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from enforcing
the Supplemental Prohibition Act of 1921, which prohibited physicians from prescribing
intoxicating malt liquors (including “Guinness’s Stout”) for medicinal purposes. Id. at 546
(argument for appellant). In addition to referring to the necessary and proper power as an
“implied” power, the appellants argued that the “incidental power of Congress to give full
effect to a delegated power” could not, consistent with the Tenth Amendment, “wholly
deprive the States of the power which that amendment reserves to them.” Id. at 548.
See id. at 558 (majority opinion) (stating that “the Constitution confers upon Congress the
power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers that are
vested in it” and describing these powers as “non-enumerated or ‘implied’ powers”).
This fact was precisely what worried Antifederalists such as George Mason. GEORGE
MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT (1787), http://
www.gunstonhall.org/library/archives/manuscripts/objections.html (“Under their own
Construction of the general Clause at the End of the enumerated powers the Congress may
grant Monopolies in Trade and Commerce, constitute new Crimes, inflict unusual and
severe Punishments, and extend their Powers as far as they shall think proper; so that the
State legislatures have no Security for the Powers now presumed to remain to them; or the
People for their Rights.”).
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commerce among the several states, the Necessary and Proper Clause describes
a power that potentially touches all the domains of congressional regulation,
but that does not itself describe such a domain.69 The necessary and proper
power is therefore enumerated, in the sense that it originates in words
contained in Article I, but the level of the enumeration seems qualitatively
different from that of other Article I powers, including those contained in the
General Welfare Clause.70
ii. the necessary and proper clause
A. Theory and History
To see how the shadow powers have returned to the center of the doctrinal
conversation, we can look to recent case law surrounding the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Before 2005, one would have been hard pressed to identify a
body of doctrine on the necessary and proper power. Unlike the commerce
power, which in a series of doctrinal boluses has expanded and contracted the
permissible scope of federal regulation of the economic realm, the necessary
and proper power has tended to ride along as a quieter, sometimes overlooked
presence in the case law—the perpetual bridesmaid to the commerce power’s
bride. For decades, commentators essentially threw up their hands in
explaining the clause, which was seen as “haunt[ing] constitutional theory
from its perch in interpretive limbo.”71 In recent years, however, the Court has
increasingly brought the necessary and proper power to the center of
federalism doctrine. Because the power is relatively undertheorized, it provides
new avenues for doctrinal development, sometimes in surprising directions.

69.

70.

71.

As commentators have noted, Congress’s necessary and proper power likely extends to
include legislation that executes powers vested elsewhere in the national government, given
the clause’s reference to “all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18;
see, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause,
40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102 (1976).
But cf. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1966 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the necessary and proper power is not an enumerated power, but appearing
to blur the enumeration/non-enumeration distinction with the primary/auxiliary
distinction); Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (setting forth
the “two general circumstances” in which “the regulation of intrastate activities may be
necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce”).
Mark A. Graber, Unnecessary and Unintelligible, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 167, 169 (1995).
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Perhaps most surprising is the steady transmutation of the necessary and
proper power from a regulatory and interpretive device that tended to expand
federal power into a tool for checking that same power.
Since 1819, the lodestar for understanding the clause has been Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland upholding the constitutionality of
the Second Bank of the United States as a valid exercise of Congress’s power.72
In McCulloch, Marshall sketched a broad—but not unlimited—necessary and
proper power, which he described as an “incidental or implied” power.73 In so
doing, Marshall planted the seed of the modern notion that the necessary and
proper power is somehow not an enumerated power, even though it is plainly
listed in Article I.74 Marshall framed the inquiry as whether Congress was
acting within one of its enumerated Article I powers in a given case (here, in
establishing the Bank); if so, then Congress had broad discretion to select the
regulatory means by which it carried out that power. Hence Marshall’s famous
statement: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.”75
Marshall’s opinion devoted little discussion to principles of state
sovereignty or the Tenth Amendment. Indeed, he rejected the argument that
the Tenth Amendment’s presence in the Constitution “excludes incidental or
implied powers” or “requires that every thing granted shall be expressly and
minutely described.”76 Limits on Congress’s regulatory power should be seen
as incorporated into the federal structure via the enumeration principle. When
Congress regulated within the realm of one of its enumerated powers,
therefore, its action could not be challenged based on non-Article I federalism
imperatives such as those that Maryland argued had been textualized in the
Tenth Amendment. Maryland might insist that the presence of the Bank and
the prohibition on state taxation of the Bank compromised its sovereignty as a

72.
73.

74.

75.
76.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 406 (“But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the [A]rticles of
[C]onfederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that every thing
granted shall be expressly and minutely described.”).
See id. at 411-12 (“To its enumeration of powers is added that of making ‘all laws which shall
be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.’”) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 18, cl. 8).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 406.
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state. But Marshall insisted that the enumerated (“great”77) powers “to lay and
collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a
war; and to raise and support armies and navies” necessarily entailed an
implied or incidental power to establish a corporation (the Bank) to execute
those powers.78 The nexus between the underlying enumerated powers and the
implied or incidental power to carry them out effectively blocked the states
from objecting that their domain had been invaded. The “government of the
Union, though limited in its powers,” was “supreme within its sphere of
action,” Marshall insisted.79 In other words, if an exercise of federal power fit
within the bounds of Article I, it could not be challenged as an overreach or a
violation of the states’ authority. The Union had a discrete sphere of action,
and within that sphere, the states’ cries of trammeled sovereignty would be
unavailing—perhaps even unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Marshall’s choice of terminology in McCulloch was intricate,
perhaps even slippery, but it shaped the doctrinal world in which we still live
today. Marshall termed what I have called the primary powers of Article I (to
tax, to borrow money, to regulate commerce, to declare and conduct war, and
to raise and support armies and navies) “great substantive and independent
power[s]” because of their status as distinct heads of congressional power, as
that power was created in Article I.80 “Greatness” was a category within the
Constitution itself, not an assessment of the relative importance of a particular
power as applied to governments generally.81 Marshall’s use of the phrase
“great substantive and independent power” to describe “the power of making
war or levying taxes or of regulating commerce” demonstrates his sense that
the enumerated/non-enumerated distinction did not quite capture the
difference between the primary powers of Article I (war, commerce, taxation)
and the implementing power described in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The great powers were what Article I said they were, and only what Article I

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 411.
See infra text accompanying notes 147-151 (summarizing NFIB’s decontextualization of
McCulloch’s “great substantive and independent power” language). But see William Baude,
Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1749 (2013) (“[S]ome
powers are so great, so important, or so substantive, that we should not assume that they
were granted by implication, even if they might help effectuate an enumerated power. These
powers, sometimes called ‘great powers,’ are the kinds of powers we would expect the
Constitution to mention if they were granted.”).
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said they were; the necessary and proper power was an explicit statement of the
basic interpretive principle that, as Marshall put it, “the powers given to the
government imply the ordinary means of execution.”82
The idea of a power necessarily implying the power to execute it is
connected to another important point about the foundational reading of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch. A careful reading of the opinion
demonstrates that, for Marshall, the necessary and proper power was an
enumerated power, not an implied power, of the federal government. It was an
enumerated power because it was listed in Article I. But it was not a primary
power. Enumerated powers might be primary powers, but they might also be
auxiliary or implementing powers.
The case of the necessary and proper power, however, was even more
complex: it was an enumerated, auxiliary power that gave Congress some
additional quantum of authority besides that which it would already have in
order to execute the primary powers underlying the creation of the Bank (tax,
borrowing, commerce, war, armies and navies). The late-eighteenth-century
mind could easily conceive of primary powers as necessarily containing the
power to execute those powers,83 but the Constitution made that common law
interpretive principle explicit by committing it to words in Article I. As Akhil
Amar notes, “Marshall suggested that perhaps the clause was merely declaratory
of what would have been the best reading of the Constitution even had the
clause not existed.”84 This interpretation is borne out by James Wilson’s
comments in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. Responding to a delegate

82.
83.

84.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 2, at 304-05 (James Madison) (“No axiom is
more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the
means are authorised; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular
power necessary for doing it, is included.”); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422
(describing the Constitution as “omitting, and wisely omitting, to enumerate all the means
for carrying into execution the great powers vested in government”).
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 28 (2012). I disagree, however, with what appears to be Amar’s
categorization of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a non-enumerated power. See id. at 27
(“With this analysis of enumerated powers in mind, let’s now return to Marshall’s
discussion of the necessary-and-proper clause.”). Marshall’s analysis would likely have led
him to uphold the Bank even absent the Necessary and Proper Clause, because he would
have viewed it as a necessary means of executing the taxation-borrowing-commerce-wararmies/navies powers. But the fact that Marshall relied at least in part on an arguably
unwritten interpretive principle does not alter the fact that the necessary and proper power
is explicitly granted and listed in Article I.
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who argued that “the general clause at the end of the eighth section gives to
Congress a power of legislating generally,” Wilson insisted that the clause was
not “capable of giving them general legislative power.” The clause meant
instead that “they shall have the power of carrying into effect the laws which
they shall make under the powers vested in them by this Constitution.”85
For most of the early twentieth century, the necessary and proper power
made occasional and relatively uncontroversial appearances, typically operating
in tandem with the commerce power. An important line of cases upheld
congressional regulation of railroad rates, milk prices, and labor standards
based on a blend of commerce power and necessary and proper power
analyses.86 The decisions did not separate the two doctrinal strands.
Frequently, they mixed discussions of the regulation of interstate commerce
itself with references to intrastate regulation that was an “appropriate means to
the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power
to regulate interstate commerce.”87 This conceptual melding of the two species
of power continued into the New Deal era, leading Justices and scholars to
posit that the New Deal expansion of the commerce power was powered by an
expansion of the necessary and proper power.88

85.

86.
87.

88.

James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Dec. 1, 1787, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 448-49 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 2, at 205 (Alexander
Hamilton) (describing the clause as potentially “chargeable with tautology or redundancy,”
but noting that it was included in the text “for greater caution, and to guard against all
cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the
legitimate authorities of the Union”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 2, at 304 (James
Madison) (noting that even “[h]ad the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be
no doubt that all the particular powers, requisite as means of executing the general powers,
would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication”).
I am grateful to Genevieve Lakier for discussions on this point.
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co, 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); see also United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819)); The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1913) (stating that the Necessary
and Proper Clause does not give “Congress . . . the authority to regulate the internal
commerce of a State, as such,” but does allow Congress “to take all measures necessary or
appropriate to” the effective regulation of the interstate market “although intrastate
transactions . . . may thereby be controlled”).
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584-85 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (describing the expansion of the Commerce Clause created by the post-New
Deal cases as “based on . . . the authority of Congress, through the Necessary and Proper
Clause, to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and
plainly adapted to the permitted end” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
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Today, the auxiliary status of the necessary and proper power is a settled
doctrinal fact.89 Even after the Court began limiting Congress’s commerce
power in a series of cases beginning with United States v. Lopez90 in 1995, the
necessary and proper power appeared to be something of a doctrinal
backwater. Indeed, the auxiliary nature of the power ensured that it was always
overshadowed by the primary Article I power to which it was attached in any
given statute or case. Parties challenging federal regulation therefore tended to
focus their arguments on the primary power, reinvigorated by the Court’s
holding in Lopez that only activity that was itself “economic” or “commercial”
in nature could validly support congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause. Arguments based on the necessary and proper power tended to be
viewed as at best routine, at worst an attempt to conjure Article I power where
none actually existed. “Since the time of McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been
clear that the [Necessary and Proper] Clause presents no formidable barrier to
legislative activity,” one commentator noted in 1983. “The terms of the clause
have always been read broadly.”91 Justice Scalia, for his part, has deemed
arguments based on the clause “the last, best hope of those who defend ultra
vires congressional action.”92 It is a hornbook axiom that Congress cannot
regulate under the necessary and proper power alone; it must base an exercise

89.

90.
91.
92.

Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 807-08 (1996)
(noting that the New Deal Court “did not simply and directly enlarge the scope of the
Commerce Clause itself, as is often believed. Rather, it upheld various federal enactments as
necessary and proper means to achieve the legitimate objective of regulating interstate
commerce”).
See United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2503 (2013) (noting that the Necessary and
Proper Clause “authorizes Congress, in the implementation of other explicit powers, to
create federal crimes, to confine offenders to prison,” and to enact several other provisions
relating to the federal prison system); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2591 (2012) (describing the necessary and proper power as vesting Congress with authority
to enact provisions “incidental to the [enumerated] power, and conducive to its beneficial
exercise” (brackets in original) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418
(1819))); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (describing the test for
Congress’s exercise of its necessary and proper power as “whether the statute constitutes a
means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated
power”).
514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”).
Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential
Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1378 (1983).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).
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of that power on an underlying enumerated power.93 The question whether the
necessary and proper power “counts” as one of Congress’s enumerated powers
continues to plague the doctrine, however.
Indeed, this lingering uncertainty about the status and scope of the
necessary and proper power has become even more acute as a consequence of
recent Supreme Court decisions. In a handful of cases since 2005, the Court has
highlighted a new set of doctrinal consequences of Marshall’s cleverness in
McCulloch. Few of these consequences, however, comport with the expansive
vision of federal power as “supreme within its sphere” that Marshall limned. In
beginning his justification for Congress’s chartering of the Bank with the
implied powers argument—that all Article I powers include the means of
exercising them—Marshall grasped for the biggest limb on the interpretive
tree. Before he even reached the specific grant of power in the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Marshall had essentially disposed of the issue on the basis of
Congress’s implied powers. Recall his statement that “the constitution of the
United States has not left the right of Congress to employ the necessary means,
for the execution of the powers conferred on the Government to general
reasoning. To its enumeration of powers is added” that of the Necessary and
Proper Clause.94 Because Marshall appears to have based some significant part
of his decision on the implied-powers principle, the scope of the enumerated
necessary and proper power has remained vague and largely undefined in the
doctrine, even as judges and commentators have continued to lard the clause
into their opinions and articles alongside discussions of the primary
enumerated powers.
Why does this latent uncertainty about the enumerated or non-enumerated
nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause matter? The answer lies in the
modern black-letter law that the necessary and proper power can be validly
used only as an auxiliary to one of the primary enumerated powers.95 In
periods of judicial deference to congressional legislation under those primary
powers (for example, the period between the New Deal expansion of the
commerce power in 1937 and its constriction in 1995 in United States v.

93.
94.
95.

Comstock, 560 U.S. at 134.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411-12 (1819).
See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 53, at 1104 (“The Necessary and Proper Clause is about meansends connections. It authorizes Congress to pass laws in order to do something. Usually,
Congress is authorized to pursue some primary goal by a provision of the Constitution other
than the Necessary and Proper Clause, frequently one of its other enumerated powers.”).
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Lopez96), the fuzzy status of the necessary and proper power is difficult to
discern and appears to have little significance. In periods of intensified judicial
scrutiny of such legislation, however, the situation is quite different.
When the Court narrows the commerce power (as it did in Lopez), the
relationship between that power and the necessary and proper power matters a
great deal. If our view of the necessary and proper power derives from the
strong implied-powers version of McCulloch, according to which the Bank was
constitutional because it was an implied means by which Congress could
exercise its primary Article I powers (taxation, borrowing, commerce, war,
armies/navies), then the scope of the necessary and proper power at any given
moment follows directly from the scope of the primary power to which it is
attached. If the Court narrows the commerce power, what happens to the
argument that Congress must have an implied means of exercising that power?
Almost certainly, the implied-power extension of that primary power would
also be narrowed. If, on the other hand, the necessary and proper power is
viewed as an enumerated power, and—importantly—even if we accept that it is
auxiliary rather than primary, its basis in the text of the Constitution would
likely afford it greater judicial deference than if its scope was seen as entirely
dependent on the scope of the primary power.
Indeed, recent doctrinal developments bear out the hypothesis. The way
the necessary and proper power has come down to us from Marshall—and
specifically its ambiguous enumerated/non-enumerated status—has permitted
the Court to confine it to a few specific regulatory domains, which rely on a
few interconnected primary powers. Paradoxically, some of these putative
primary underlying powers are themselves non-enumerated, the most notable
being Congress’s power to establish a body of federal criminal law.97 Within
those areas, the clause has been read fairly broadly, but the fact that it is
cabined in those areas necessarily limits its overall reach. The uncertain scope
and status of the necessary and proper power have permitted the Court to use
the power as a means of constraining federal regulatory power, rather than—as
the Antifederalists feared, and as Marshall hoped—as a textual and structural
foundation for the principle that the government of the Union is supreme
within its defined sphere. To see how this result came about, let us examine the
case law.

96.
97.

514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
See, e.g., United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2503 (2013); Comstock, 560 U.S. at 13637.
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B. Recent Doctrine
The Necessary and Proper Clause returned to center stage in 2005, in the
somewhat surprising vehicle of Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment in
Gonzales v. Raich.98 In permitting the federal Controlled Substances Act to
override California’s medical marijuana statutes, Justice Scalia recast much of
the twentieth-century commerce power case law as turning in fact on the
necessary and proper power.99 The crucial point for Scalia was that in the allimportant regulatory arena of activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce, the real source of Congress’s power was in fact the Necessary and
Proper Clause, not the Commerce Clause.100 Whenever Congress was a step
removed from an enumerated power, Justice Scalia argued, in order for its
regulatory action to be valid, that action had to be based on the necessary and
proper power.101 To the extent that prior cases had treated the “substantial
effect” inquiry as part of Commerce Clause doctrine, they were “incomplete
because the authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of
interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce,” Justice Scalia observed.102
Indeed, on Justice Scalia’s reading, the necessary and proper power greatly
expanded the reach of Congress’s regulatory power: “Where necessary to make
a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those
intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate
commerce.”103 But the Article I power that enabled that regulation came from
the Necessary and Proper Clause, not the Commerce Clause. This distinction
separated Justice Scalia’s reasoning from that of the other five Justices in the
majority, all of whom took the view that Congress’s commerce power included

98.
99.

100.
101.

102.
103.

545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 33-34 (describing as “mechanical[] recit[ation]” and “misleading and incomplete”
previous cases’ inclusion of activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce in the
three categories of permissible regulation under the Commerce Clause).
Id.
Id. at 34 (“[U]nlike the channels, instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce,
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate
commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause
alone. . . . Congress’s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves
part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”).
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
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“the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance
with California law.”104 The five Justices who joined the majority opinion105
implicitly endorsed McCulloch’s implied-powers argument, insofar as they
based their view principally on the commerce power, with the necessary and
proper power mentioned almost as an afterthought. Writing for the Court,
Justice Stevens blended the commerce and necessary and proper discussions to
such a degree that his opinion reads as though they were a single unit of
analysis.106 Justice Scalia’s concurrence, in contrast, treated the necessary and
proper power as a discrete power that, while auxiliary, amounted to a distinct
source of congressional authority.
Justice Scalia’s Raich concurrence appeared as though it might open
doctrinal space for a broader reading of the necessary and proper power,
especially as the Court held to its narrow reading of the commerce power in
cases following Lopez.107 As the doctrine subsequently unfolded, however, it
became clear that a necessary and proper power that was closely tied to the
commerce power—and perhaps too casually theorized—was susceptible to the
same constrictions as the commerce power. In cases following Raich, several
Justices picked up Justice Scalia’s necessary and proper analysis and applied it
in other contexts to uphold congressional regulation, with the result that a
distinct body of Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine and commentary
appeared to be developing for the first time since McCulloch.108 But the status
of the necessary and proper power remained unsettled. Moreover, it was
difficult to rationalize the state of the doctrine: was it really sensible to have a

104.
105.
106.

107.

108.

Id. at 5 (majority opinion).
The Raich majority comprised Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas dissented.
Tellingly, Justice Stevens did not cite the two as separate clauses of Article I, Section 8. See
Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. He did, however, cite Wickard v. Filburn, the 1942 case that is typically
regarded as the high-water mark of the Court’s deference to Congress’s assessment that
intrastate, nonmarket activity may nonetheless be reached when it is a “‘necessary and
proper’ implementation of the power of Congress over interstate commerce,” 317 U.S. 111,
119 (1942). See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (“Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive
legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting
well within its authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.’”).
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act as aimed at conduct insufficiently connected
to interstate commerce to justify regulation under the commerce power).
See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Regrettable Clause: United States v. Comstock and the
Powers of Congress, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 713 (2011).
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broad necessary and proper power at the same time as a narrow commerce
power? The difference might have been ascribed to shifting majorities on the
Court, but for the crucial role Justice Scalia’s Raich concurrence had played in
launching the new developments.
The newly prominent Necessary and Proper Clause again proved
dispositive to the Court’s analysis five years later, in United States v.
Comstock.109 In Comstock, the Court relied on the necessary and proper power in
upholding a federal civil commitment statute for persons convicted of federal
sex offenses.110 Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer held that the statute was a
valid extension of Congress’s authority to establish federal criminal law; the
fact that the federal criminal law was itself based on an implied power of Article
I did not trouble the Court.111 The Court rejected the argument that “when
legislating pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress’s authority
can be no more than one step removed from a specifically enumerated
power,”112 calling such an argument “irreconcilable with our precedents.”113
Justice Breyer’s opinion pointed out that even the dissenting justices
acknowledged
that Congress has the implied power to criminalize any conduct that
might interfere with the exercise of an enumerated power, and also the
additional power to imprison people who violate those (inferentially
authorized) laws, and the additional power to provide for the safe and
reasonable management of those prisons, and the additional power to
regulate the prisoners’ behavior even after their release.114
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence took a similar approach, stating that analysis
under the Necessary and Proper Clause “depends not on the number of links in
the congressional-power chain but on the strength of the chain.”115 Here, he

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
Id. at 1964-65.
Id. at 1964.
Id. at 1963-64.
Id. at 1963 (“[F]rom the implied power to punish we have further inferred both the power to
imprison and . . . the federal civil-commitment power.” (citations omitted)).
Id. at 1964.
Id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy noted that he wrote
separately in order to emphasize the importance of Tenth Amendment federalism concerns
in analyzing regulation under the necessary and proper power. His view thus blended the
two sides of the Hammer v. Dagenhart analysis: look to Article I (Holmes) but also the Tenth

2070

the shadow powers of article i

found that the chain connecting Congress’s authority to establish the federal
criminal law was sufficiently robust also to permit it to mandate federal civil
commitment for some convicted sex offenders.
The result in Comstock led some observers to wonder whether the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the aughts would reprise the high-profile
commerce power of the period between 1937 and 1995.116 The Court appeared
to anticipate this concern and took steps in its opinion to alleviate it, stating,
“[n]or need we fear that our holding today confers on Congress a general
police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and
reposed in the States.”117
But Justice Scalia appeared not to share this comfort with the Comstock
holding. Despite his crucial role in reviving the doctrinal force of the necessary
and proper power in his Raich concurrence, Justice Scalia joined Justice
Thomas in dissenting from the Court’s application of the power to the civil
commitment statute. The dissent cited the Raich concurrence for the principle
that although the Necessary and Proper Clause “‘empowers Congress to enact
laws . . . that are not within its authority to enact in isolation,’ those laws must
be in ‘effectuation of [Congress’s] enumerated powers.’”118 Having launched
the second career of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the context of federal
drug regulation (a decision from which Justice Thomas had also dissented),
Justice Scalia took a different view of the power in relation to federal civil
commitment of sexually dangerous persons. The dissenters’ principal objection
to the statute at issue in Comstock was its attenuated relationship to any
particular enumerated power.119 Absent such a connection, the dissenters
appeared to view the case as though Congress had based the statute on a bare
assertion of the necessary and proper power, and nothing else—that is, as

116.

117.
118.
119.

Amendment (majority). See id. at 1967-68 (“It is correct in one sense to say that if the
National Government has the power to act under the Necessary and Proper Clause then that
power is not one reserved to the States. But . . . [i]t is of fundamental importance to
consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion
of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting
that the power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.”).
See, e.g., Powell, supra note 108, at 715 (describing the Justices in Comstock as “taking sides in
an ancient debate” and, in so doing, “reopen[ing] an issue that ought to be deemed long
settled”).
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1973 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
Id. (“The Government identifies no specific enumerated power or powers as a constitutional
predicate for §4248, and none are readily discernable.”).
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though a decision to uphold the regulation would transform the power from an
auxiliary into a primary tool. Indeed, the dissent expressed skepticism that a
claim of congressional power grounded in the Necessary and Proper Clause
might ever pass constitutional muster.120
The specter of the commerce power haunts the analysis in Comstock, with
unfortunate and muddying consequences for the doctrine. At oral argument,
the Justices and the advocates circled around the commerce power, sometimes
distinguishing it from the necessary and proper power and sometimes using it
as an analogue. Justice Kennedy pressed then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan to
make the commerce power argument for the civil commitment statute; in
response, Kagan noted that “the government has never argued the Commerce
Clause here in the sense that it has never argued that these activities have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, and it hasn’t done so because of . . .
the Morrison precedent.”121 The government appeared to have made a policy
decision in Comstock not to challenge the applicability of Morrison’s narrow
reading of the commerce power to the civil commitment statute, but the
Justices and advocates alike seem to have recognized the awkward analytical
results for the later case.122 One example was the government’s somewhat
strained connection between the individual being subjected to civil
commitment and the federal criminal justice system as the crucial tie between
the regulation and a primary Article I power.123 But using an existing physical

120.

121.

122.

123.

Id. at 1983 (“Not long ago, this Court described the Necessary and Proper Clause as ‘the last,
best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action. Printz.’ . . . Regrettably,
today’s opinion breathes new life into that Clause, and—the Court’s protestations to the
contrary notwithstanding . . . —comes perilously close to transforming the Necessary and
Proper Clause into a basis for the federal police power that ‘we always have rejected.’”). But
see Powell, supra note 108, at 761-71 (criticizing the Comstock opinions for reopening a
Jeffersonian versus nationalist debate over congressional authority).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (No. 08-1224) (citing United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down remedy provision of the Violence
Against Women Act as beyond the scope of the commerce power)).
Consider Justice Kennedy’s use of the commerce power as both an analogy and a disanalogy
for the standard of review to be applied in cases under the necessary and proper power. See
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1966-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also Aziz Z. Huq,
Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 588 (2013)
(examining the use of tiers of scrutiny in cases under Article I).
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 121, at 23-24 (argument of Solicitor General
Elena Kagan) (“[T]he essential tie to a congressional power is the tie of these people to the
Federal criminal justice system because they are in Federal custody.”); cf. Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (upholding Congress’s criminalization of bribes involving
organizations receiving federal funds). Justice Stevens replied skeptically: “But isn’t it true
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link between the individual being regulated and a location of federal power
(here, a federal prison) as evidence that the individual should continue to be
the subject of federal power is a conceptually different type of connection than
the classic McCulloch-style inquiry into the nexus between the regulation (e.g.,
Congress’s creation of the Bank) and an enumerated power (e.g., the powers to
borrow, tax, regulate commerce, make war, and raise armies and navies).
The question of the proper level of generality at which the link between the
regulated activity and the relevant enumerated power ought to be evaluated has
continued to bedevil the necessary and proper doctrine. The power made a
brief but important appearance in the Court’s 2012 decision in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius124 (NFIB), in the section of the
healthcare case concerning the individual mandate provision of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly referred to as the ACA). The
analysis in NFIB demonstrated the powerful consequences of Justice Scalia’s
revival of the necessary and proper power in his Raich concurrence. Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court held that the individual mandate was
not a “proper” means of carrying out Congress’s enumerated powers because it
would “draw within [Congress’s] regulatory scope those who would otherwise
be outside of it.”125 The result in NFIB surprised many commentators, who had
assumed that the Court’s broad reading of the necessary and proper power in
Comstock would lead it to uphold the individual mandate.126
The Chief Justice then devoted the remainder of his three-page discussion
of the necessary and proper power to distinguishing NFIB from Raich and
Comstock. Despite these efforts at distinction, however, the Court imported two
of the most questionable elements from those cases. First, the Court’s main
objection to the individual mandate again blurred the line between the
necessary and proper power and the commerce power, as the Raich majority

124.
125.

126.

that this statute applies even if a person has not been a sexual offender in the past?” Solicitor
General Kagan replied, “It . . . does, Justice Stevens.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 121, at 24.
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2573; see Andrew Koppelman, “Necessary,” “Proper,” and Health Care Reform, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 111 (Nathaniel
Persily, Gillian Metzger & Trevor Morrison eds., 2013) (noting two prior decisions in which
the Court held that a law might be necessary but not proper).
See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Legal Memo: Terrain Shifts in Challenges to the Health Care Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/29/health/policy/29legal.html; see
also Koppelman, supra note 125, at 105 (stating that under “the settled law” of Necessary and
Proper Clause jurisprudence, the Affordable Care Act was “obviously constitutional” at the
time it was enacted).
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had done. Second, the Court adopted the Comstock Court’s approach to
assessing the connection between the activity to be regulated and the
enumerated power to which that activity was tied. Both these analytical strands
came together in a single paragraph of the decision:
This is in no way an authority that is “narrow in scope,” Comstock, or
“incidental” to the exercise of the commerce power, McCulloch. Rather,
such a conception of the Necessary and Proper Clause would work a
substantial expansion of federal authority. No longer would Congress
be limited to regulating under the Commerce Clause those who by some
preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of federal
regulation.127
If Comstock gave us the Court adjudicating in the shadow of the Commerce
Clause, NFIB brought the narrow post-Lopez/Morrison commerce power back
into the doctrinal fray and made it an integral part of the necessary and proper
power analysis.128 Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s statements in the quoted
paragraph: upholding the individual mandate under the necessary and proper
power would automatically expand the scope of the commerce power as well.
There is some irony here with respect to the legacy of Justice Scalia’s expansive
necessary and proper power in Raich. In Raich, Justice Scalia (but not the
majority) had separated the necessary and proper power from the commerce
power, insisting that any regulation under the “effect on interstate commerce”
prong of McCulloch and Lopez was in fact an exercise of the necessary and
proper power, not the commerce power.129 That analysis made it theoretically
possible to sustain a regulation under the necessary and proper power as an
auxiliary to the commerce power, even though that regulation could not be
sustained under the commerce power itself. Although Justice Scalia had not
gone so far as to categorize the necessary and proper power as itself an
enumerated power,130 he had presented it as an analytically distinct element of

127.
128.

129.
130.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See also David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act, 2012 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (critiquing the Court’s reasoning in NFIB for paying too little attention
to post-Lopez principles and instead “return[ing] to the days before 1937 to hold, on the
basis of arguments that do not withstand analysis, that the Commerce Clause did not
authorize a major piece of federal legislation”).
See supra text accompanying notes 98-108.
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating
that “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of
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Congress’s authority. The Court had extended this interpretation in Comstock.
In NFIB, however, Chief Justice Roberts recombined the two strands.131 Once
the Court had held the ACA invalid under the commerce power, the necessary
and proper portion of the opinion followed. The contours of the necessary and
proper power largely tracked those of the commerce power.
Similarly, consider the Chief Justice’s statement that Congress must be
limited to regulating individuals “who by some preexisting activity bring
themselves within the sphere of federal regulation.”132 In Comstock, the
preexisting connection between the regulated activity and the federal sphere
was the individual’s presence in federal custody. In NFIB, the individual
mandate failed this test because it sought to “vest[] Congress with the
extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an
enumerated power.”133 In other words, Congress got the timing wrong. The
implication of the Court’s argument was clear: Congress would not be
permitted to bootstrap a substantial effect on interstate commerce out of the
very regulation at issue in the case. But recall the skepticism with which the
Court greeted the government’s claim in Comstock that the entire civil
commitment scheme rested on the fact that the individuals in question were in
federal custody at the time the ongoing commitment was ordered. The
traditional necessary and proper framework dating from McCulloch had not
looked to the nexus between particular individuals and federal power; it was
not analogous to a question of personal jurisdiction. (If that had been the case,
it is difficult to see how the newly created Second Bank of the United States
could have been upheld—because it continued to hold assets that had once
been held by the First Bank? Surely that fact alone would not have sufficed.)
On the contrary, the inquiry turned on the link between the activity to be
regulated and the particular primary Article I power cited as the source of the
regulation.
In the brief period since the NFIB decision, the Court has continued to
endorse an approach to the necessary and proper power that focuses on the
regulated individual’s relationship to federal power. Timing, and a special

131.

132.
133.

interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the Commerce
Clause alone” (emphasis added)).
One might ask whether Chief Justice Roberts would even have devoted a separate section of
the NFIB opinion to the Necessary and Proper Clause were it not for Justice Scalia’s
highlighting of it as a distinct head of regulatory power in Raich.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592.
Id.
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relationship to federal power, again proved dispositive in United States v.
Kebodeaux,134 in which the Court upheld the application of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) to an individual who had been
convicted by a special court-martial of a sex offense. As in Comstock, the Court
upheld Congress’s exercise of the necessary and proper power in the realm of
federal criminal law, with the additional weight in Kebodeaux of the Military
Regulation Clause.135 Again, the tie to a permissible Article I purpose came not
from the connection between the activity Congress sought to regulate and a
specific, primary congressional power, but from a particular individual’s prior
presence within the federal system.
Yet Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court in Kebodeaux suggested a broader
vision of the Necessary and Proper Clause, hearkening to Holmes’s dissent in
Hammer and the view that the scope of Article I should be determined on the
basis of Article I alone, and not influenced by concerns about preserving a
sphere of state sovereignty. To support this point, Justice Breyer cited a 1924
decision upholding a federal Prohibition statute for the proposition that the
Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to “adopt any means,
appearing to it most eligible and appropriate, which are adapted to the end to
be accomplished and consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution.”136
Despite the differing holdings in NFIB and Kebodeaux, these two most
recent analyses by the Court of the Necessary and Proper Clause demonstrate
the clause’s increased importance for modern debates about the meaning of
federalism. As part of the NFIB analysis, the Court explicitly linked the
necessary and proper power and the commerce power. In so doing, the Court
demonstrated the way in which Chief Justice Marshall’s implied-powers
reasoning in McCulloch, which in that case had supported Congress’s creation
of the Bank, could be redirected toward a constriction of federal power. If the
scope of the auxiliary necessary and proper power was analytically connected to
the primary power to regulate commerce, then the Court’s decision to
constrain the commerce power would also narrow the necessary and proper
power.
The outcome of these cases suggests a paradoxical conclusion: Chief Justice
Marshall’s broad reading of Article I, according to which all the primary

134.
135.
136.

133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2503 (citing James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559
(1924)).
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powers include the means of exercising them, made it possible for a later Court
to restrict the reach of the necessary and proper power as a derivative of the
commerce power, and in so doing to shrink the permissible domain of
congressional regulation. Perhaps even more surprising is that the alternative
to Chief Justice Marshall’s implied-powers argument came from Justice Scalia,
whose concurrence in Raich offered a way to view the necessary and proper
power as auxiliary but also as a meaningful source of federal regulatory
authority beyond the scope of the primary Article I powers.137 Justice Scalia’s
Raich concurrence set the stage for the inferential reasoning that supported the
Court’s decision to uphold the civil commitment statute in Comstock and the
notification requirement in Kebodeaux. In the latter cases, however, the
concurrence’s author attempted to contain the consequences of his analysis by
arguing that the exercise of the auxiliary power was too many steps removed
from any identifiable primary power.138
As these cases demonstrate, working through the Necessary and Proper
Clause has again become a required step in judicially enforced federalism.
Contrary to its early days, however, the clause has increasingly been used to
avoid the crucial issue of the proper scope of Congress’s Article I power; in
some cases, it has functioned as a tool for the Court to check federal power,
either by tying the clause directly to a narrowed commerce power, or else by
confining the clause’s operation to situations involving a formalistic, quasijurisdictional nexus between specific individuals and federal instrumentalities.
In short, far from the fount of federal police power that some observers have
feared the Necessary and Proper Clause might become,139 the clause has
become a subtle doctrinal hurdle to congressional regulation.

137.

138.

139.

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(distinguishing between the “power to make regulation effective” and “the authority to
regulate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,” both of which
Justice Scalia argued were properly understood as stemming from the Necessary and Proper
Clause; in his view, the federal Controlled Substances Act fell under the former category).
See Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2509-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s
conclusion that the defendant was already subject to a valid exercise of federal power at the
time the SORNA requirement was applied to him); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S.
126, 159 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.) (stating that § 4248
“[e]xecut[es] no enumerated power” (alterations in original)).
See, e.g., Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2507 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“I worry
that incautious readers will think they have found in the majority opinion something they
would not find in either the Constitution or any prior decision of ours: a federal police
power.”); see also MASON, supra note 68. But see Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2503 (noting that the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to, inter alia, “create federal crimes, to
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Indeed, the same Justices who are committed to hewing to limits on the
commerce power have also tended to offer the most creative readings of the
shadow powers. Consider, for example, the arc traveled by the necessary and
proper power from Lopez to Raich to Comstock. The majority opinion in Lopez,
which Justice Scalia joined, contained no reference to the Necessary and Proper
Clause; the Court did not discuss whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 might be permissible under that power.140 Instead, the majority confined
its analysis to the commerce power and held that the statute was invalid
because it was not a regulation of economic activity.141 In Raich, however, the
Necessary and Proper Clause was the pivotal ingredient in both the majority
opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurrence.142 After Raich, the necessary and
proper power appeared to be an avenue of potentially broad congressional
power that survived the Court’s avowedly stringent commerce-power
reasoning in Lopez.143 The Court’s decision in Comstock upholding the civil
commitment provision continued this expansive reading of the necessary and
proper power, building on the sharp bifurcation between the necessary and
proper power and the commerce power that Justice Scalia set forth in his Raich
concurrence.144 The result in Comstock demonstrated the power of Justice
Scalia’s distinction between the powers. Paradoxically, moreover, Justice
Scalia’s dissent from the Comstock majority145—and his apparent skepticism at

140.
141.
142.

143.

144.
145.

confine offenders to prison, to hire guards and other prison personnel” in the execution of
its enumerated powers).
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The three dissenting opinions were
similarly silent on the subject of the necessary and proper power.
Id. at 567.
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (holding that “Congress was acting well within its authority to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to regulate commerce . . . among the
several states” when it enacted comprehensive regulation of the intrastate market in
marijuana) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); but cf. Barry Friedman &
Genevieve Lakier, “To Regulate,” Not “To Prohibit”: Limiting the Commerce Power, 2012 SUP.
CT. REV. 255, 258-59 (questioning whether the Commerce Clause, properly understood,
“includes the power not only to . . . ‘protect’ interstate markets but also to ‘eradicate’
them”).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down
t[he] road [of a congressional police power], giving great deference to congressional action.
The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion,
but we decline here to proceed any further.”).
Note again that Justice Scalia signed on to Justice Thomas’s dissent in Comstock.
See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 180 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by
Scalia, J., in part) (“Not long ago, this Court described the Necessary and Proper Clause as
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oral argument of the government’s argument that the civil commitment
provision was a permissible exercise of the necessary and proper power146—
served to highlight the Necessary and Proper Clause’s doctrinal transformation
from a murky commerce power addendum to a distinct, visible, and therefore
controversial source of congressional power.
A broad reading of a shadow power similarly accompanied, and arguably
enabled, a narrow reading of a primary power in NFIB. Consider the
progression of Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis of the individual mandate
provision, from the commerce power to the necessary and proper power to the
taxing power. Having determined that the individual mandate was not a
permissible exercise of the commerce power because it failed the Lopez test of
regulating economic activity,147 Chief Justice Roberts next moved to the
necessary and proper power as a separate step of analysis. Here, again, the
individual mandate failed to pass muster. Chief Justice Roberts seized on a
phrase from McCulloch v. Maryland148 and decontextualized it to create a new
limitation on the necessary and proper power. The individual mandate was not
analogous to the regulation of the intrastate marijuana market in Raich because
“Raich . . . did not involve the exercise of any ‘great substantive and
independent power,’ of the sort at issue here.”149 Why the regulation of the
intrastate market in healthcare (or, more precisely, self-insurance) amounted to
a “great substantive and independent power” was left unclear. Also

146.

147.
148.

149.

‘the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.’ Regrettably,
today’s opinion breathes new life into that Clause, and—the Court’s protestations to the
contrary notwithstanding—comes perilously close to transforming the Necessary and
Proper Clause into a basis for the federal police power that ‘we always have rejected.’”
(citations omitted)).
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 121, at 13 (“Justice Scalia: General Kagan, you
are relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause, right? . . . Now, why is this necessary for
the execution of any Federal power? . . . You could say it’s necessary for the good of society,
but that’s not what the Federal Government is charged with. Why is it necessary to any
function that the Federal Government is performing?”).
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819) (“The power of creating a corporation, though
appertaining to sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of
regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied
as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing them.”). Interpreted in
context, and with a proper understanding of historical speech, it is clear that Chief Justice
Marshall was using the phrase “great substantive and independent power” to mean “powers
already explicitly enumerated in Article I.” He was not establishing an extra-textual category
of unnecessary and improper, or otherwise un-impliable, powers.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593 (citation omitted).
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unacknowledged was the sudden appearance of a new distinction in the case
law between permissible uses of the necessary and proper power (e.g., to plug
holes in existing regulatory schemes150) and uses that appeared, in some
vaguely defined way, to be simply too large in scale to be permitted by such a
potentially expansive provision as the Necessary and Proper Clause.151
The problem with the trajectory of shadow powers analysis is that it
combines a claim of doctrinal stringency in one area (the post-Lopez commerce
power) with an unacknowledged doctrinal slipperiness in another area (the
necessary and proper power). Moreover, the Court’s increasingly sharp
separation between the two powers suggests that regulations under the
Necessary and Proper Clause are less constitutionally firm than those
authorized by the Commerce Clause. But, as the long line of decisions dating
from the early twentieth century demonstrates,152 the commerce power and the
necessary and proper power have a long history of conceptual and doctrinal
overlap. Because the necessary and proper power has traditionally been
understood as an auxiliary of the commerce power, recent decisions that treat
the former as a distinct basis of congressional regulation inevitably search in
vain for firm precedents that contain reasoning specific to the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The result is to undermine the necessary and proper power
while appearing to treat it as equal in weight to the commerce power.
Both the General Welfare Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause thus
might be thought of as doctrinal workarounds,153 tools for the Court to find
pressure points in the case law in order to yield new insights about the

150.

151.

152.
153.

Chief Justice Roberts’s necessary and proper analysis was thus also premised on a temporal
distinction between different types of federal regulatory schemes. See id. at 2592
(distinguishing the “continued confinement of those already in federal custody” (Comstock)
and “those who by some preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of federal
regulation” (Comstock and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)) from “vest[ing] Congress
with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an
enumerated power” (the individual mandate)).
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion can be seen as the apogee of shadow powers analysis, insofar
as the individual mandate was upheld as an exercise of the taxing power after having failed
to meet the criteria for the commerce power or the necessary and proper power. The shadow
power of the General Welfare Clause thus prevailed where the shadow power of the
Necessary and Proper Clause did not.
See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
See Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution and the Spending Power 5, 31 (Univ. of Chi.
Pub. Law Working Paper No. 420, 2013) (discussing nineteenth-century constitutional
workarounds). See generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499
(2009) (describing workarounds as tools for achieving particular goals that are politically
popular but prohibited by certain constitutional provisions).
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permissible scope of congressional power.154 They are shadowy, however,
because of their textual and structural ambiguity, because it is not clear that
they can bear the interpretive weight being placed upon them, and because
their new prominence is based on unarticulated premises yet presented as
dictated by precedent.
iii. the general welfare clause
Like the necessary and proper power, the powers housed in the General
Welfare Clause of Article I155 have assumed a newly prominent role in the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions concerning the scope of congressional power.
As is also the case for the Necessary and Proper Clause, the General Welfare
Clause contains ambiguous language regarding the means and ends of
permissible congressional regulation. The clause is the opening provision of
Article I, Section 8. It states, “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”156 Are the taxing
and spending powers the means to achieving the ends of common defense and
general welfare for the nation? Or is providing for the common defense and
general welfare another means, an additional source of authority for Congress
to regulate toward some other (unstated) end? Unlike the necessary and proper
power, which has throughout its history been understood as auxiliary, the
taxing and spending powers have traditionally been listed among the primary,
enumerated powers of Congress.157 But the two clauses are similar in that both
have resurfaced in recent doctrine as the Court tries different approaches to the

154.

155.
156.
157.

As David Strauss notes, the Necessary and Proper and General Welfare Clause analyses set
forth in NFIB may have different consequences for future federal legislation. The limits on
the commerce and necessary and proper powers set forth in NFIB will cabin congressional
power “only when the government tries to involve private parties, and therefore may have to
resort to the Commerce Clause.” If a given program is funded by tax revenues, however, the
enacting legislation would presumably rely on the taxing power. Thus “the more the
government is involved in a program, the less NFIB will affect it; NFIB will come into play,
if at all, when the government increases the role of the private sector.” Strauss, supra note
128, at 28.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (adopting the Hamiltonian view of
the General Welfare Clause and concluding that “[w]hile . . . the power to tax is not
unlimited, its confines are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of § 8 which
bestow and define the legislative powers of the Congress”).
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old problem of assessing congressional regulation’s congruence with the
Constitution’s commitment to federalism.158
The taxing and spending powers of the General Welfare Clause may fairly
be termed shadow powers because although they appear uncontroversial,
secondary, and innocuous compared to their polarizing Article I companion,
the commerce power, they nevertheless contain the potential for both doctrinal
expansion and contraction. Like the Necessary and Proper Clause, the General
Welfare Clause appears to have a non-substantive, almost neutral orientation;
neither is “about” a specific subject or establishes a particular domain for
Congress. The power to tax and spend in some form is a basic tool of
government generally, and the necessary and proper power is an instruction
(perhaps a tautology,159 perhaps not) to the federal government that it can
execute the powers confided to it.
The path of the General Welfare Clause began in early controversy,
traversed a lengthy period of settlement, and has recently reached a new
ground of contestation and uncertainty. Following several decades in the
founding and early national periods in which the meaning of the clause—
specifically, the connection between the taxing and spending powers and the
“general welfare of the United States”—was hotly debated,160 the clause settled
down in the early twentieth century to become arguably the second most
important source of enumerated congressional authority after the commerce
power.161
From the founding era through the early nineteenth century,
commentators such as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas
Jefferson argued over what the General Welfare Clause meant. Three main
views emerged, holding that the clause ought to be understood as (1) a
freestanding power to regulate for the common defense and general welfare (a

158.

159.
160.
161.

See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (drawing a parallel between the necessary and proper power and the spending
power in discussing the relevant standards to be applied to each).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 2, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the clause
as potentially “chargeable with tautology or redundancy”).
See LaCroix, supra note 153 (examining early-nineteenth-century debates about the scope of
the clause, especially the spending power).
See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995);
David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry
Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85; see also
Edward S. Corwin, supra note 32, at 552 (arguing that the general welfare power should be
viewed as “not an independent grant of power, but a qualification of the taxing power”).
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view that was not widely held but that was nevertheless frequently invoked in
debate);162 (2) a statement that Congress might tax and spend for the common
defense and general welfare (Alexander Hamilton’s view);163 or (3) a statement
that Congress might tax and spend only in pursuit of its other enumerated
powers (James Madison’s view).164 According to all three views, the taxing and
spending powers contained in the General Welfare Clause were enumerated;
the difference concerned whether they were primary (Addison and Hamilton)
or merely auxiliary (Madison).
In 1936, the Court adopted what it termed the Hamiltonian view of the
General Welfare Clause (although the Justices went on to invalidate the tax at
issue as impermissible “regulation”).165 On this view, the Court stated, “the
clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, is not
restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a
substantive power to tax and to appropriate.”166 Over the course of the
twentieth century, therefore, the General Welfare Clause came to be
awkwardly divided between the two doctrinal paths of the taxing power and
the spending power.167 Beginning in the 1930s, taxing power cases typically

162.

163.

164.

165.
166.

167.

One of the main proponents of this view was the Pennsylvania judge Alexander Addison,
who argued that the clause granted Congress three distinct powers: to tax, to spend, and to
legislate for the general welfare. See Alexander Addison, Analysis of the Report of the
Committee of the Virginia Assembly, in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITINGS DURING THE
FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, at 1055 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983); see
also JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCE BOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 3, 32 (1991) (describing Addison’s views).
Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23,
1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 129 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) (“The
constitutional test of a right application must always be whether it be for a purpose of general
or local nature. If the former, there can be no want of constitutional power. The quality of
the object, as how far it will really promote or not the welfare of the union, must be matter
of conscientious discretion.”).
James Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 375
(Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981) (arguing that a broad interpretation of
the General Welfare Clause “would render nugatory the enumeration of particular
powers”).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
Id. at 61; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (adopting the four-part
test of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), according to which the exercise of
the spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare, the condition must be
unambiguous, the condition must have some relation to the federal interest in a particular
program, and the condition cannot violate any other constitutional provision).
See Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (upholding a program that conditioned federal funds to states on
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focused on federal taxation of individuals,168 while spending power cases
tended to concern Congress’s authority to use federal funds to encourage states
to adopt particular programs or policies.169 These conditional spending
programs and the bargains they entailed became a key tool in Congress’s
regulatory arsenal and a way of working around objections to direct regulation
of states qua states, although they sometimes prompted the objection that
states were being coerced.170 The taxing power, meanwhile, was seen as
relatively uncontroversial, albeit powerful.171
Today, however, the meaning of the General Welfare Clause is again in
transition, as the doctrine works through a period of crisis of a type not seen
since the 1930s, when the question of the federal government’s power to
regulate the broader economy consumed both political and constitutional
debates.172 A syntactically challenging clause that had, over the course of the
twentieth century, achieved the status of an escape hatch for Congress became
the focus of intense scrutiny in the Court’s 2012 decision in NFIB v. Sebelius.173

168.

169.

170.

171.

172.

173.

states’ compliance with minimum legal drinking age); Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (striking down the
tax provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Steward Machine, 301 U.S. 548
(upholding the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935).
See, e.g., Butler, 297 U.S. at 75, 78 (invalidating tax on agricultural commodities under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as beyond the scope of the “taxing and spending
power”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012)
(upholding the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act under the taxing
power).
See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603, 2607 (upholding in part and invalidating in part the
ACA’s expansion of state-run Medicaid programs); Steward Machine, 301 U.S. 548
(upholding the Social Security Act’s scheme of encouraging employers to pay taxes to state
unemployment compensation fund). Insofar as the ACA’s individual mandate was an
exercise of the taxing power, while the Medicaid expansion was a conditional spending
program, NFIB represented the melding of what had been two distinct lines of reasoning
about regulation of individuals versus regulation of states.
See Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590 (discussing the point at which “pressure turns into
compulsion”); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 215 (“There is a clear place at which the Court can
draw the line between permissible and impermissible conditions on federal grants.”).
See Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975 (2011) (arguing for
reconceiving the taxing power as having potentially as broad a scope as the spending
power).
See Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84 (2012)
(describing NFIB as “challeng[ing] th[e] basic constitutional consensus” that “the fight over
the federal government’s proper role in the economic sphere” is “largely political, not
constitutional”). See generally THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 125 (discussing
constitutional issues surrounding NFIB).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593-609.
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In upholding the ACA’s individual mandate under the taxing power
component of the General Welfare Clause174 but striking down the act’s
Medicaid expansion provision under the spending power,175 the Court revived
an earlier, more stringent version of its spending power analysis while also
expanding Congress’s taxing power. NFIB, then, was a split decision for the
General Welfare Clause as a whole. But the decision plants a marker for future
federalism analysis. The taxing power and the spending power, and the
underlying idea that there is something called “the general welfare of the
United States,” will likely be prominent sites of debates over federalism in the
coming years.
The most striking element of the NFIB decision, for purposes of shadow
powers analysis, is the Court’s apparent desire to use roundabout doctrinal
means to test the overall quantum of federalism in the current American
system. The majority opinion canvasses virtually the entire relevant landscape
of Article I, trying every available doctrinal door in order to arrive at its
conclusions. Two points are particularly noteworthy for this discussion: first,
the change to existing spending power doctrine that the decision brought
about; second, the dearth of references to the Tenth Amendment in the
majority’s opinion.
In invalidating the conditional spending program attached to the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion,176 the Court revived an inquiry into the potentially
coercive nature of such programs that it had all but discarded in the decades
since the 1930s,177 when it announced the coercion test in United States v.

174.
175.

176.

177.

Id. at 2600 (upholding the ACA’s requirement that individuals pay a penalty for not
obtaining insurance).
Id. at 2603 (invalidating a provision permitting the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to withdraw existing Medicaid funds from states that fail to comply with the ACA’s
requirements).
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (“[The States] object that Congress has crossed the line
distinguishing encouragement from coercion in the way it has structured the funding . . . .
Given the nature of the threat and the programs at issue here, we must agree.” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1342 (2013) (referring to “the
discredited doctrine of United States v. Butler that Congress may not use its spending power
to ‘purchase a compliance which Congress is powerless to command’”); David E. Engdahl,
The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1994) (noting that the Butler Court “declared that
Hamilton had it right but so misunderstood him that they actually decided the case
according to the contrary, restrictive Madisonian view”).
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Butler.178 The return of coercion to the doctrine, after decades of conditional
spending cases in which the Court upheld regulation despite only a nominal
connection between the imposed condition and Congress’s regulatory end,179
suggests that the Court is not averse to reexamining doctrinal elements that
many commentators had assumed were no longer contested.180 Especially
noteworthy is the return of Butler, a pre-1937 precedent in which the Court
held not only that a key piece of New Deal legislation “invades the reserved
rights of the States,” but also that the “plan of regulation” contained in the act
was not a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing power.181 In NFIB the
Court acknowledged that all taxes were potentially regulatory,182 but the
adoption of a test derived from a period when a more formalist distinction
between taxation and regulation obtained was still startling.183 Moreover, the
Butler Court had developed the coercion analysis in the context of a tax
provision, not a conditional spending program. Yet the NFIB majority
imported the Butler coercion test from its origin in the taxing power, in an era
of suspicion about taxes, into the modern conditional spending realm, despite
the fact that the conditional spending power had previously been understood
as offering the broadest avenue for congressional regulation under Article I.184

178.
179.
180.

181.

182.
183.

184.

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936) (describing the statute at issue as “coercion by
economic pressure” because “[t]he asserted power of choice is illusory”).
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (highway funding and minimum
drinking age).
See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federal Perspective, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1629, 1656 (2006) (noting that “commentators have debated vigorously whether many
forms of conditional federal spending are actually mandatory in practice because the
Rehnquist Court declined to put teeth into Dole’s non-coercion requirement”).
Butler, 297 U.S. at 59, 68. The analysis in Butler focused on the taxing power rather than
conditional spending. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Owen Roberts,
subsequently identified as the Justice responsible for the “switch in time that saved nine.”
See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 13, at 118.
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012) (noting that “taxes that seek to influence conduct are
nothing new”).
Recall John Dickinson’s argument in 1765 that taxation of the colonies for the purpose of
empire-wide regulation was permissible, but that taxation merely to raise revenue was not—
i.e., the opposite of the Court’s conclusion in Butler. See supra text accompanying notes 4850.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (stating that “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s
enumerated legislative fields may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending
power and the conditional grant of federal funds” (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
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The lack of references to the Tenth Amendment in the Court’s opinion is
also striking. With the exception of a single citation in its preliminary
description of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision,185 the majority did not refer to
the textual and doctrinal provision at the center of the Court’s “federalism
revolution” of the 1980s and 1990s.186 Instead, the Court couched its
discussion of the Medicaid conditional spending provision in terms of contract
and individual freedom.187 Quoting an earlier decision holding that Congress
could not “commandeer” state legislatures in which the Court had relied
heavily on a robust reading of the Tenth Amendment, the Court in NFIB
appeared to downplay the state sovereignty argument in favor of the individual
liberty argument.188 Despite the fact that previous decisions invalidating
congressional acts as unauthorized by the Commerce Clause discussed the
Tenth Amendment frequently and at length,189 and despite the obvious
relevance of the Court’s anticommandeering precedents to its decision about
the Medicaid provision, the NFIB Court declined to discuss the
Amendment.190
The lack of any substantive reference to the Tenth Amendment in the
decision is additional evidence that the current form of the federalism debate
has cycled back to its 1930s incarnation, rather than continuing in the line laid
down by the “new federalism” cases of the 1980s and 1990s. Justice Holmes’s
emphasis on Article I in his dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart has returned to the
forefront of the Court’s approach to federalism questions involving
congressional regulation, but with a newly stringent application. The Court
evaluated the ACA through the lenses of the commerce, necessary and proper,

185.
186.
187.
188.

189.

190.

See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
See id. at 2578 (“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”) (quoting New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)). On the developing doctrinal link between
federalism and individual rights, see Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99
VA. L. REV. 1435 (2013).
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Nat’l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
The dissenters discussed the amendment in terms familiar from the Court’s previous
decisions. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(describing the existence of “structural limits upon federal power” as “absolutely clear,
affirmed by the text of the 1789 Constitution, by the Tenth Amendment ratified in 1791, and
by innumerable cases of ours in the 220 years since”).
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taxing, and spending powers, and found the act deficient in three of those four
categories. Again, the narrowed commerce power—here actually present before
the Court—appeared to guide the majority’s analysis of the other Article I
powers. Moreover, the spending power issue directly implicated the states as
states, but the Court’s emphasis on contract and individual liberty allowed it to
avoid the potentially unproductive Tenth Amendment analysis of previous
decades. Here again, the shadow powers of Article I entered into the doctrine
when the direct lines of analysis—the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment—appeared to have reached the limits of their usefulness. And yet
again, the shadow powers pushed the Court toward Justice Holmes’s Article I
approach in Hammer rather than the Hammer majority’s focus on the Tenth
Amendment, with the counterintuitive result that the Court held the Act
insufficient to meet the requirements for three of the four Article I powers at
issue. In short, the NFIB decision demonstrated that it was possible to adopt
Justice Holmes’s technique of analyzing the powers of Congress detached from
state sovereignty concerns without also endorsing Justice Holmes’s conclusion
that the Court should defer to Congress’s reasonable assessment of the scope of
its powers.191 As with the return of the necessary and proper power, the Court’s
interpretation of the taxing and spending powers in NFIB pushes the doctrine
back toward the Article I methodology of the Hammer analysis, but with a very
different result.
iv. the shadow powers and the union
What, then, is the significance of the shadow powers for modern
federalism doctrine? And why should it matter whether the Court upholds a
particular provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause or the General
Welfare Clause as opposed to the Commerce Clause?

191.

See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280-81 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I had
thought that the propriety of the exercise of a power admitted to exist in some cases was for
the consideration of Congress alone and that this Court had always disavowed the right to
intrude its judgment upon questions of policy or morals. . . . The act does not meddle with
anything belonging to the States. They may regulate their internal affairs and their domestic
commerce as they like. But when they seek to send their products across the state line they
are no longer within their rights.”); accord James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545,
558 (upholding Prohibition regulation on the ground that “if the act is within the authority
delegated to Congress by the Eighteenth Amendment, its validity is not impaired by reason
of any power reserved to the States”).
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Viewed from a distance, the decision of the Court in NFIB that the
individual mandate was a permissible exercise of the taxing power, but not the
commerce or necessary and proper powers, might have little significance for
the overall quantum of federal regulation. Viewed from the closer perspective
of a potential litigant or an advocate, however, the choice of doctrinal pathway
matters enormously for how a claim is structured. Viewed from inside
Congress, moreover, the Court’s interpretive stance affects how legislation is
drafted, what (if any) findings are included, and whether jurisdictional hooks
such as requiring that a particular item (e.g., a gun192) have traveled in
interstate commerce are incorporated. And viewed from the perspective of the
Constitution’s deep background commitment to a principle of federalism, the
Court’s choice to use the textually and structurally ambiguous Necessary and
Proper Clause or General Welfare Clause in a given case should be seen as an
indication that the Court is using Article I to sound, and perhaps change, the
contours of federal regulatory power.193 The powers set forth in the clauses are
shadow powers because they appear less controversial than their substantively
specific Article I neighbor, the commerce power, but they nevertheless
implicate foundational questions of how federalism works—and how it ought
to work—in practice.
For the Founders, Federalists and Antifederalists alike, the key issue was
how to build a union. They had many different ideas of what that union might
look like. The broad array of possibilities available to them included a
commonwealth with a single sovereign monarch but separate legislatures, like
Scotland and England between 1603 and 1707; a shared, sovereign, and entirely
new legislature, like Great Britain after 1707; or a general government to
handle external affairs with colonial or state governments retaining authority
over internal matters, like the de facto situation of British North America and
the United States under the Articles of Confederation.194 But their focus was on
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Consider the post-Lopez retooling of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. §
922(q) (2006), to include a requirement that the firearm in question “has moved in or
otherwise affects interstate commerce.”
Cf. Powell, supra note 108, at 771 (noting that “questions involving the interpretation of the
[Necessary and Proper C]lause unavoidably present the issue of how we are to understand
more generally the scope of legislative power under the Constitution”).
See LACROIX, supra note 1, at 20-29 (discussing North American colonists’ experiences with
various provincial unions and contemporary precedents involving Scotland and Ireland); see
also Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History: A Reply to Gordon
Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (2011) (discussing the many theories and practices of multiple
sources of legal authority circulating in late-eighteenth-century British North America).
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making a union, not on maintaining the states as states. The novelty for the
Founders was conceiving of the United States as a distinct entity that might
have a distinct general welfare. Recall Dickinson’s citation in 1765 of the
“general welfare” of the greater British Empire as a permissible justification for
previous taxes levied on the colonies by Parliament.195 Dickinson invoked the
general welfare of the entire empire as a legitimate purpose of trade regulation,
including taxation, by Parliament. “We are but parts of a whole; and therefore
there must exist a power somewhere, to preside, and preserve the connection in
due order.”196 Not only the power, but also the duty of the central legislature,
then, was to make such regulations as were “necessary for the common good of
all.”197 Notably, both Dickinson’s “general welfare” and Dulany’s “necessary or
proper” emerged in the context of taxation, the original concurrent power that
virtually all participants in the imperial and founding-era debates believed
must be held concurrently by legislative bodies at both the center and the
periphery.
When modern judicial federalists take as their mission the preservation of
state sovereignty, they tend to look to history, particularly that of the Founding
Era, for support.198 But more often than not, they misread that history. To the
extent one can reasonably generalize about the views of late-eighteenth-century
North American commentators, their focus on federalism derived from their
preoccupation with the problem of forming a viable and enduring union.
Federalism was their particular answer to the question of how to build a union.
It was a tool, and later a normative value, but it was not an end in and of
itself.199 As the Dickinson example demonstrates, the imperative of building a
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See DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 16.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 12.
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) (“Under the
Government’s logic, that authorizes Congress to use its commerce power to compel citizens
to act as the Government would have them act. That is not the country the Framers of our
Constitution envisioned.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (stating that
“the Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through
the States”).
See LACROIX, supra note 1, at 216-18 (giving examples of contemporary views of federalism
defined in relation to particular types of union); see also Alison L. LaCroix, Commandeering
Federalism, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 7, 2010, 11:33 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/04
/commandeering-federalism.html (noting as one of the lessons of federalism’s history for
modern doctrine the fact that “uncertainty about the ‘real’ meaning of federalism in practice
has as long a lineage as federal ideas themselves” insofar as “[s]imilar debates to the ones
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union was felt strongly by the members of the founding generation.200
Moreover, the Tenth Amendment was initially promoted by Federalists who
feared that the enumeration of rights contained in the Bill of Rights would be
read as an exhaustive list, rather than by the Antifederalists or Jeffersonians,
who are often lionized by the “new federalists.”201
Indeed, by the early nineteenth century, appeals to an almost mystical
conception of “the Union” increased in frequency and fervor, eventually
replacing earlier decades’ invocations of “the Republic” with a phrase and a
concept that spoke directly to the complexities of federal-state relations. As
Abraham Lincoln put it in his speech before the Young Men’s Lyceum of
Springfield, Illinois, in 1838, American government was sustained by “the
attachment of the People” and was therefore imperiled when citizens suffered
the “alienation of their affections from the Government.”202 Lincoln’s solution
was for the chief texts of the Union, the “Constitution and Laws,” to join the
Declaration of Independence to comprise the “political religion” of the nation.203
No less a devotee of state sovereignty than John C. Calhoun saw himself as a
Union man, engaged in a dialogue with the Founders and contributing to an
ongoing founding moment even after he foreswore his membership in the
Federalist Party.204 At the outbreak of the Civil War, President Lincoln would
invoke no less authority in his first inaugural address than “universal law and
. . . the Constitution” to argue that “the Union of these States is perpetual.”205
To the extent that modern federalism doctrine relies on some combination
of historical sources, originalist interpretation, and historical practice, it is
crucial to understand that precedents for both the Necessary and Proper and
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that played out in the Court’s classic anticommandeering cases . . . took place in the first few
decades of the Republic’s existence”).
See LACROIX, supra note 1, at 113-20, 123-24 (discussing concepts of union as they were
developed by Thomas Jefferson and by members of the Continental Congress in the 1770s).
See MAIER, supra note 65, at 451.
Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield (Jan. 27, 1838), in
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 11, 15-16 (Richard N. Current ed., 1967).
Id. at 16-17; see also Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 247, 270 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1959) (evaluating the
“Union-saving measure” of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and concluding, “[m]uch as I hate
slavery, I would consent to the extension of it rather than see the Union dissolved”).
See, e.g., John C. Calhoun, The South Carolina Exposition and Protest (1828), in 10 THE PAPERS
OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 442, 507-29 (Clyde N. Wilson & W. Edwin Hemphill eds., 1977).
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 202, at 168.

2091

the yale law journal

123:2044

2014

General Welfare Clauses emerged as part of arguments for centralized
legislative authority over matters pertaining to the empire, and later the Union,
as a whole. Another way to put this argument is to say that American
federalism has historically assumed a meaningful scope of operations in which
the power of the Union will operate. Still another way to put it is to say that
some areas of government power are aimed at what Dickinson termed “the
common good of all,”206 and what we might also call the general welfare of the
United States. Within those areas, the federal government must have the
power to act—not necessarily exclusive power, but some meaningful amount of
power. This is the enumeration principle of Article I—derived from prerevolutionary sources, glossed by Marshall in McCulloch, and extended by
Holmes in his Hammer dissent.
From a structural perspective, moreover, one justification for the Court to
apply forceful limits to federal power is the belief that the states have a discrete
domain or “sphere” of regulatory autonomy.207 Even if this claim is accurate,
however, it does not preclude the existence of a specific sphere of federal
regulatory authority. The whole purpose of a union, in the colonial and
founding eras as today, was not to have a consolidated, unitary government,
but rather to bring a group of entities together under a single overarching
authority.208 Within the defined sphere of its powers and duties, that unionlevel government must have the means of carrying out the ends confided to it.
Indeed, in McCulloch, Marshall made this point explicitly: “[T]he Government
of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of
action. . . . The nation, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily
bind its component parts.”209 The government of the United States was
established in order to create a species of polity denominated as a union. The
purpose of that union was to function as a nation with respect both to external
affairs and to a somewhat defined set of internal affairs.210 While these facts do
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DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 12.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Were
the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political
responsibility would become illusory.”); see also BARBER, supra note 16, at 89-121 (discussing
and critiquing “states’ rights federalism”).
See also Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 6, 44 (2010) (describing a “nationalist account” of federalism).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S.
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not necessarily establish that the federal government was intended as the
equivalent of a national government, they do demonstrate that a key purpose of
federalism has always been to provide a basis for a union and for a nation. The
question for federalism, then and now, is what the best conception of federal
union should be. Federalism, in other words, has always been the United
States’ distinctive species of nationalism.
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